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Survey of Professional Responsibility
courts as unconstitutional.
Brian N. Corrigan & Eileen Cotter Donovan
Ex PARTE COMMUNICATIONS WITH EMPLOYEES OF, A BUSINESS
ENTERPRISE: THE NEED FOR A BRIGHT LINE TEST
INTRODUCTION: THE EXISTING PROBLEM
X.X.X., Inc. is a hypothetical company incorporated and legally
doing business in State A. X.X.X., Inc. has a typical corporate
structure, consisting of directors, senior and junior executives,
managers, workers and an office support staff, with a normal turn-
over of personnel occurring in all positions. In its course of busi-
ness X.X.X., Inc. becomes embroiled in a legal dispute with P.
Litigation commences and the discovery process begins. P's attor-
ney plans to contact present and former employees of X.X.X.,
Inc. to conduct informal ex parte1 communications. Counsel for
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 576 (6th ed. 1990). Ex parte is defined as "[o]n one side
only." Id. Communication is defined as "the sharing of knowledge by one with another."
Id. at 279. The term ex parte communication/contact is used to describe contacts made
between one counsel and witness/parties for the opposing side without the opposing coun-
sel's knowledge and/or presence. See generally Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,
395-96 (1981) (use of "ex parte communication" consistent with above description and sets
minimum standard which must be followed when dealing with employees of business enter-
prise); Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Serv. Ltd., 745 F. Supp.
1037, 1039 (D.N.J. 1990) (ruling upon motion to prohibit ex parte communication with
former employees); Polycast Technology Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 621, 628
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (no ethical bar against ex parte communications with former employees);
Niesig v. Team I, 76 N.Y.2d 363, 368, 558 N.E.2d 1030, 1031-32, 559 N.Y.S.2d 493, 494
(1990) (denying employer's ability to prevent ex parte communications with low-level and
former employees); Stahl, Ex Porte Interviews with Enterprise Employees: A Post-Upjohn Analy-
sis, 44 WASH. & LEE L REV. 1181, 1182 (1987) (analyzing theories on protecting employees
from ex parte interviews).
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X.X.X., Inc. objects to this process, claiming it constitutes a viola-
tion of ethical standards2 and the attorney client privilege." Will
the interview be allowed? If allowed, will any restrictions be-
See Aronson, An Overview of the Law of Professional Responsibility: The Rules of Professional
Conduct Annotated and Analyzed, 61 WASH. L. REV. 823, 877 (1986) (State of Washington's
Rules of Professional Conduct's focus on ethical responsibilities of lawyers conducting ex
parte interviews with corporate employees); Leubsdorf, Communicating with Another Lawyer's
Client: The Lawyer's Veto and the Client's Interest, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 683, 708 (1979) (criticiz-
ing as unethical allowance of contacts, and interviews of employees of opposing party by
adverse counsel without notice to opposing counsel); Miller & Calfo, Ex Parte Contact with
Employees and Former Employees of a Corporate Adversary: Is it Ethical?, 42 Bus. LAW. 1053,
1053 (1987) (tactical advantage of ex parte contacts with current and former employees
and ethical issues raised where rules not clear); Stahl, supra note 1, at 1182 (noting sound
policy why ethical restrictions on ex parte interviews with past and present employees
should be coextensive with attorney client privilege); Stevens, Wyoming Rules of Professional
Conduct: A Comparative Analysis, 23 LAND & WATER L. REV. 463, 507-08 (1988) (how Wyo-
ming Rules of Professional Conduct regulate ethical conduct of lawyers when communicat-
ing with unrepresented persons); Comment, Ex Parte Communication with Corporate Parties:
The Scope of the Limitations on Attorney Communications with One of Adverse Interest, 82 Nw.
U.L. Rev. 1274, 1275 (1988) [hereinafter Comment, Ex Parte Communication] (impact of
Model Code's and Model Rules of Professional Responsibility's requirement of consent of
opposing counsel before ex parte contact with adverse client permissible); Comment, Ethics
of Conducting Ex Parte Interviews, 3 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 234, 235 (1988) [hereinaf-
ter Comment, Ethics] (risks of ethical violations when conducting ex parte interviews with
employees of corporate adversary); infra note 5 (text of professional conduct rule against
communication with person represented by attorney).
I See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389. "The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privi-
leges for confidential communications known to Common Law." Id. (citing 8 J. Wigmore,
Evidence §2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961)). The Supreme Court in Upjohn further stated
that
[The attorney-client privilege's] purpose is to encourage full and frank communica-
tion between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public inter-
ests in the observance of law and administration of justice. The privilege recognizes
that sound legal advice or advocacy depends on the lawyer's being fully informed by
the client.
Id.
The privilege rests on the need for lawyers to know all that relates to the client's reasons
for seeking representation in order to properly and fully represent the client. Id. However,
the Court noted that the privilege does not offer a clear definition of who is protected
when the client is "an artificial creature of the law, and not an individual . . . [however]
[t]his Court has assumed that the privilege applies when the client is a corporation." Id. at
389-90 (citing United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915)).
See Stahl, supra note 1, at 1182-83. The author observed that:
[There are] those who argue that the privilege interferes with the search for truth
and those who believe that the privilege is a necessary prerequisite to complete free-
dom of consultation between a lawyer and a client .... [P]ractitioners and scholars
have long argued, and no doubt will continue to argue over the policy considerations
which underlie the existence and scope of the attorney-client privilege, especially as
applied to corporations.
Id. See also Miller & Calfo, supra note 2, at 1053-55 (violations of attorney-client privilege
possible where rules on ex parte communications unclear).
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placed on P's attorney concerning whom he can interviewor the
extent of the questioning?
Presently, it is impossible to answer these questions with any de-
gree of certainty." Since ethical rules proscribe that parties repre-
sented by counsel may not be contacted ex parte,5 the central is-
sue becomes which, if any, employees of a corporation may be
considered a "party" to an action.' Courts currently employ four
' See PSE&G, 745 F. Supp. at 1039 (rule limiting ex parte communications easily applied
where adverse party is individual, but difficult where adverse party is corporation); Polycast,
129 F.R.D. at 626-27 (court notes divergent views on whether current or former employ-
ees of corporations are protected by rule prohibiting ex parte communications with ad-
verse party); Niesig, 76 N.Y.2d at 370, 558 N.E.2d at 1033, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 496 (difficult
defining scope of rule limiting ex parte communications where adverse party is corpora-
tion); Wright by Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 103 Wash. 2d 192, 197, 691 P.2d 564,
567 (1984) (conflicting policies as to whether corporate party's employee should be consid-
ered "party"). See generally Miller & Calfo, supra note 2, at 1053 (ethical rules regulating ex
parte contacts with current and former employees of corporate adversary lack clarity);
Stahl, supra note 1, at 1185-87 (various theories used by courts when determining extent
of allowing ex parte interviews with adverse corporation's employees); Comment, Ex Parte
Communications, supra note 2, at 1275-76 (same); Comment, Ethics, supra note 2, at 735-36
(courts use four tests when determining who may not be interviewed).
a See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(A)(1) (1981). The discipli-
nary rule originally adopted in 1908 states:
DR 7-104 Communicating With One Of Adverse Interest
(A) During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not:
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the represen-
tation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he
has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other party or is authorized by
law to do so.
Id. The American Bar Association interpreted this rule in conjunction with Canon 9,
which provides that "A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impro-
priety," and stated that the Code "does not allow a communication with an opposing party,
without the consent of his counsel, though the purpose merely be to investigate the facts."
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Informal Op. 187 (1938).
RULE 4.2 OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT which was enacted to replace
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility, states:
Rule 4.2 Communication With Persons Represented by Counsel
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the
representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in
the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by
law to do so.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 4.2 (1983). The Model Code Comparison
contained under Rule 4.2 states that "[tlhis Rule is substantially identical to DR 7-104
(A)(1)." Id. (Model Code Comparision).
e See Stahl, supra note 1, at 1184. The Commentator states:
The ethical obligations imposed by the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
governs lawyers' conduct in a majority of jurisdictions, have created at best confu-
sion and uncertainty, and at worst conflicting obligations, when counsel for a party
to pending or prospective litigation wishes to interview the employees of an adverse
party .... DR 7-104(A)(1) provides that a lawyer shall not "communicate on the
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theories to determine when an employee is considered a "party"
for the purposes of ex parte communications when dealing with a
business enterprise:
1) Allowing ex parte communications between opposing counsel
and current low-level employees, and all former employees; 7
2) Allowing ex parte communications between opposing counsel
and all former employees;8
3) Allowing ex parte communications between opposing counsel
and former employees who do not possess privileged information
on the litigated issue; and 9
subject of the representation with a party he knows to be represented" by counsel
without the "prior consent of the lawyer representing such other party." Unfortu-
nately, the Code does not define the term "party". As a consequence, these vague
injunctions may effectively put a lawyer in an ethical dilemma when faced with an
opportunity to conduct an ex parte interview of another party's employee ...
Id. See also Niesig v. Team 1, 76 N.Y.2d 363, 370-71, 558 N.E.2d 1030, 1033, 559
N.Y.S.2d 493, 496 (1990) (problem applying DR 7-104(A)(1) to corporations given Code's
failure to define "party").
7 See, e.g., Bouge v. Smith's Management Corp., 132 F.R.D. 560, 561 (D. Utah 1990)(rule prohibiting communication with represented party does not apply to ex parte inter-
views with low level employees); University Patents, Inc. v. Kligman, 737 F. Supp. 325, 328(E.D. Pa. 1990) (rule prohibiting ex parte communications meant to apply only to employ-
ees who could bind company); Suggs v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., No. 86 c. 2774 (S.D.N.Y.
April 24, 1990) (Westlaw, Allfeds library) (opposing counsel only precluded from speaking
to employees on matters within scope of their employment); Lizotte v. New York City
Health and Hosp. Corp., No. 85 c. 7548 (S.D.N.Y. March 13, 1990) (Westlaw, Allfeds
library) (opposing counsel may communicate with employee once he is fully advised and
informed of rights); Mompoint v. Lotus Dev. Corp., 110 F.R.D. 414, 418 (D. Mass 1986)(ex parte communication with current employees allowed if need to gather information is
greater than organization's interest in effective counsel); Frey v. Department of Health &
Human Serv., 106 F.R.D. 32, 35-36 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (prohibits ex parte contacts with high
level managerial employees only); Niesig, 76 N.Y.2d at 374, 558 N.E.2d at 1035, 559
N.Y.S.2d at 498 (rule prohibiting communications directly with party known to have coun-
sel only includes employees whose acts or omissions can bind corporation); Wright by Wright,
103 Wash. 2d at 201, 691 P.2d at 569 (employee considered "party" if has sufficient legal
authority to bind corporation). See generally Leubsdorf, supra note 2, at 708 (proposing
unlimited communications directly with any employee without notice to employer); Com-
ment, Ex Parte Communication, supra note 2, at 1298 (adopts theory similar to Wright).
8 See, e.g., DiOssi v. Edison, 583 A.2d 1343, 1345 (Del. Super. Ct. 1990) (rule prohibit-
ing ex parte communications does not apply to former employees); Monsanto Co. v.
AETNA Casualty and Sur. Co., 593 A.2d 1013, 1020 (Del. Super. Ct. 1990) (ex parte
contacts with former employees permitted where full disclosure of situation is made); Na-
tional Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., No. 87C-SE-1 1 (Del. Super. Ct. July 20,
1990) (Westlaw, DE-CS library) (same). See also Miller & Calfo, Ex Parte Contact, supra note
2, at 1071 (ex parte contacts with current employees of corporate adversary should require
opposing counsel's consent).
9 See, e.g., Curley v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 134 F.R.D. 77, 82 (D.N.J. 1991) (allowing
ex parte contacts with former employees except those with whom communication would
violate ethical rules); Polycast Technologies Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 621, 629
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4) Allowing ex parte communications between opposing counsel
and any party who was not employed at any time by the
employer."
I. DEALING WITH CURRENT EMPLOYEES
It is submitted that ex parte communications between counsel
and the current employees of an adversary should be prohibited.
The foundation for this restriction lies in the law of agency, spe-
cifically the treatment of current employees as agents of their em-
ployers." It is further submitted that there are important corol-
laries of an agency relationship which are ignored by allowing
counsel to contact current employees of an adversary. One conse-
quence of such a relationship is that an agent owes a duty to the
company to follow all reasonable company directives.1 2 Second, an
agent has a duty to act in the best interests of the company. 8 Fi-
nally, acts or statements of an agent may be attributed to the com-
pany. 4 It is proposed that when read in conjunction with the ethi-
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (ex parte communications with former employees allowed except when
employee possesses privileged information); American Protection Ins. Co. v. MGM Grand
Hotel-Las Vegas, Inc., Nos. CV-LV-82-26 HDM, CV-LV-82-96 HDM (D. Nev. March 11,
1986) (Westlaw, Allfeds library) (same as Curley).
10 See, e.g., Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Serv., Ltd., 745 F.
Supp. 1037, 1042 (D.N.J. 1990) (both present and former employees considered repre-
sented by corporate attorney thereby prohibiting all ex parte communications); American
Protection Ins. Co. v. MGM Grand Hotel-Las Vegas, Inc., 765 F.2d 925, 926 (9th Cir.
1985) (barring ex parte communications with former employees) (withdrawn and vacated).
See also Sperber v. Washington Heights-West Harlem-Inwood Mental Health Council, Inc.,
No. 82 c. 7428 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1983) (LEXIS, Genfed library) (use of term "any other
person" in Model 1 Rule that prohibits ex parte communication in broad enough to cover
former employees); Stahl, supra note 1, at 1225 (arriving at same conclusion as PSE&G).
C.f Chancellor v. Boeing Co., 678 F. Supp. 250, 253 (D. Kan. 1988) (ex parte communica-
tions not allowed with any employee, former or current, who was involved in issue in con-
troversy); Amarin Plastics v. Maryland Cup Corp., 116 F.R.D. 36, 40 (D. Mass. 1987) (pro-
hibits ex parte communications with any former employee who is shown able to impute
liability to company).
" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958). According to the Restatement, an
"agent" is defined as a person whom, by consent, acts on behalf of another party, the
"principal," in a fiduciary relationship, and is subject to control of that party. Id.
See id. (agent must obey principal's orders).
18 See id. (agent is under continuous subjection to will of principal).
14 See id. at § 286. Restatement § 286 provides that:
In an action between the principal and a third person, statements of an agent to a
third person are admissible in evidence against the principal to prove the truth of
facts asserted in them as though made by the principal, if the agent was authorized
to make the statement or was authorized to make, on the principal's behalf, any
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cal precepts espoused by the American Bar Association in the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Disciplinary Rule 7-
104(A)(1), a5 the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rules
3.4(f)(1) 6 and 4.2,7 and the Supreme Court's decision in Upjohn
Co. v. United States,18 these principles clearly support and require
the prohibition of ex parte communications with current
employees.
II. DEALING WITH FORMER EMPLOYEES: THE PROBLEM
It appears that opposing counsel's desire to conduct informal ex
parte interviews with former employees does not conflict with
agency law since an agency relationship no longer exists between
the employee and its former corporate employer. 9 Neither the
ethical rules nor the Supreme Court has specifically addressed
how former employees should be treated during discovery. 20 This
statements concerning the subject matter.
Id.
'B See supra note 5 (text of DR 7-104(A)(1)).
o MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3,4(f)(1) (1983). Section (f)(1) states
that, "A lawyer shall not request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily
giving relevant information to another party unless the person is a relative or an employee
or another agent of a client." Id. Comment 4 to Rule 3.4 says that "[plaragraph (f) permits
a lawyer to advise employees of a client to refrain from giving information to another
party, for the employees may identify their interests with those of the client." Id. at com-
ment 4.
" See supra note 5 (text of Rule 4.2). See also Cagguila v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 127
F.R.D. 653, 654-55 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (ex parte statements taken from current employee not
admissible under Rule 4.2).
'6 449 U.S. 383 (1981). The Court found that all current employees possess the ability
to bind the corporation, and ex parte communications with employees who can, in fact,
bind the company should not be permitted. Id. at 391. The Court stated that:
Middle-level and indeed lower level employees can, by actions within the scope of
their employment, embroil the corporation in serious legal difficulties, and it is only
natural that these employees would have the relevant information needed by corpo-
rate counsel if he is adequately to advise the client with respect to such actual or
potential difficulties.
Id. Therefore, the Court extended the attorney-client privilege to communications within
the duties of the employee. Id. at 395. This corresponds with the purpose of the attorney-
client privilege which, in a corporate setting, is to encourage communication of relevant
information between the corporate counsel and the employee. Id. at 392.
" See supra notes 11-14 and corresponding text (parameters of agency relationships).
"0 Compare MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) with MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1981). Neither the Model Rules nor the Model Code directly ad-
dress how an attorney is to treat former employees or agents of an organization. Id. More-
over, the Court's most recent decision on ex parte communication, Upjohn Co. v. United
States, does not address treatment of former employees during discovery. Upjohn, 449 U.S.
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lack of guidance has led to the dissection of the existing ethical
rules2' and Supreme Court interpretations,22 and has resulted in
semantical arguments based on certain terms contained in these
materials."3 The result has been that individual judges have ap-
plied their own standard for these rules, 2 producing inconsistency
within jurisdictions. 5 This disparity can produce deleterious ef-
fects for an attorney, who in good faith may breach, by acts of
commission or omission, ethical standards26 based on prior deci-
sions within a single judicial district. Such situations are not only
vexatious, but can have a detrimental effect on the disposition of a
case.27 In addressing such inconsistency, the Supreme Court has
stated that, "[a]n uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be
certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is
little better than no privilege at all." ' 28 It is submitted that a uni-
form approach must be adopted which conforms to the standards
of ethics and certainty.
at 383.
See supra notes 5 & 16 and corresponding text (listing relevant ethical rules).
" See supra note 18 and corresponding text (Upjohn is only Supreme Court case dealing
with ex parte communications between opposing counsel and corporate employees).
23 See supra notes 7-10 and infra notes 29-62 and corresponding text (discussion of com-
peting theories set forth by courts).
24 See supra notes 7-10 and corresponding text (reviewing divergent standards applied by
judges).
25 Compare Sperber v. Washington Heights-West Harlem-Inwood Mental Council, Inc.,
No. 82 c. 7428 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1983) (LEXIS, Genfed library) with Suggs v. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc., No. 86 c. 2774 (S.D.N.Y. April 24, 1990) (Westlaw, Allfeds library) and
Polycast Technologies Co. v. Uniroy~il, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). All three
cases were heard in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, but three distinctly different interpretations were employed in dealing with the
nearly identical issue of the extent to which ex parte communications may be allowed. Id.
Compare Curly v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 134 F.R.D. 77 (D.N.J. 1991) with Public Serv.
Elec. & Gas Co. v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Serv. Ltd., 745 F. Supp. 1037 (D.N.J. 1990).
The magistrate in Curley expressly declined to follow the standard set by PSE&G. Curley,
134 F.R.D. at 82.
20 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1983). The Model Rules state
that an attorney must provide competent representation with all the skill, thoroughness
and preparation which may be reasonably necessary. Id. Therefore, it is submitted that
attorneys who conduct ex parte interviews when not allowed or who fail to conduct inter-
views if allowed are breaching this ethical responsibility to their clients.
27 See, e.g., National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., No. 87C-SE-11 (Del.
Super. Ct. July 20, 1990) (Westlaw, DE-CS library). Here, a motion appealing a decision
where attorneys were disciplined for conducting ex parte interviews was reviewed. Id. Al-
though the appeal was granted, this led to a delay in the disposition of the case and uncer-
tainty as to the availability of the attorneys to work on the case. Id.
"8 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
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III. DEALING WITH FORMER EMPLOYEES: THE OPTIONS
Courts and legal academicians are divided among the three the-
ories on how to deal with an adversary's desire to contact a corpo-
ration's former employees.2" Before suggesting or adopting any
particular theory, it is first necessary to make a critical analysis of
each.
A. Allowing Ex Parte Communications with all Former Employees
There are several attractive qualities to this theory. The most
important aspect is its easy implementation: the only parties per-
mitted to be contacted are former employees of the company.
Proponents of this option may point to the official comment of
Rule 4.2 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct which states
that "any person whose act or omission ... may be IMPUTED to the
organization," to describe with whom ex parte communications
are prohibited. 3 It follows that since former employees can no
longer bind the company, ex parte interviews with them should be
allowed. 1 Although it can be contended that the Model Rules
should have no effect in jurisdictions where the older Model Code
is still applicable, such a view is incorrect because Model Rule 4.2
" See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text (discussion of theories and illustrative
cases).
"O MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble, Scope and Terminology (1983)
(emphasis in original). The comments are the official interpretations of the Model Rules,
and although "the text of each Rule is authoritative .... the comments are intended to
guide the interpretation [of the Rules]." Id. Therefore, it is submitted that the phrase,
"any person whose act or-omission... may be imputed to the organization," is the official,
and only attempt to define party. See id. at Rule 4.2 at comment. See also Comment, Ex
Parte Communication, supra note 2, at 1275 (noting ambiguity in term "party" in corporate
setting).
"1 See Niesig v. Team I, 76 N.Y.2d 363, 374, 558 N.E.2d 1030, 1035, 559 N.Y.S.2d 493,
498 (1990). The New York Court of Appeals employs a test restricting ex parte communi-
cations in which it defines impute in the context of an "employee whose acts or omissions
in the matter under inquiry are binding on the corporation ... or IMPUTED to the corpora-
tion for the purposes of its liability." Id. (emphasis added). The court states that the appli-
cation of its standard will prohibit ex parte contacts only "with those officials ... who have
the legal power to bind the corporation in the matter or who are responsible for imple-
menting the advice of the corporation's lawyer or any member of the organization whose
own interests are directly at stake in representation." Id. See also Defendant's Affidavit of
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Serv.
Ltd., 745 F. Supp. 1037 (D.N.J. 1990). Professor Hazard states that "persons who are not
relatives or present employees are 'fair game.' " Id.
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has been recognized as "substantially identical to DR 7-
104(A)(1)," and thus should be given great interpretive weight.3 2
Another attraction to this theory is that it would allow non-attor-
ney investigators to conduct the ex parte interview, since it is not
a formal deposition, and thereby, would apparently reduce the le-
gal fees of the client.3 3 Facially, this theory offers easy implemen-
tion and a cost efficient standard; however, it is submitted that this
theory also possesses several significant deficiencies.
Initially, the term "bind" is not a recognized interpretation for
the word "impute." '34 Since this theory is based on the assumption
that such a recognition exists, it is, therefore, erroneous at its
core.
Additionally, allowing ex parte contact with former employees
fails to take into account the fact that former employees may still
possess confidential information, even though they can no longer
impute liability to the corporation. Such information is beyond
32 See supra note 5 (showing model code comparison). See also Polycast Technologies Co.
v. Uniroyal, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 621, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (appropriate to use Rule 4.2 to
determine scope of DR 7-104(A)(1)); Chancellor v. Boeing Co., 678 F. Supp. 250, 253 (D.
Kan. 1988) (court adopts official comment to Rule 4.2 as portion of its.definition of
"party" as used in DR 7-104(A)(1)); Amarin Plastics v. Maryland Cup Co., 116 F.R.D. 36,
39-40 (D. Mass. 1987) (employs comment of Rule 4.2 upon finding no significant difference
between Rule 4.2 and DR 7-104(A)(1)).
" C.f PSE&G 745 F. Supp. at 1043. The court claims that "[in the context of litigation
involving an organization, the importance of the informal interview is greatly exaggerated,
particularly when its use threatens to produce needless and costly procedural litigation."
Id.S" See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 758 (6th ed. 1990). Impute is defined as "to attribute
vicariously." Id. See also PSE&G, 745 F. Supp. at 1042 (defines impute as "[t]o credit to a
person or a cause"(quoting Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 578 (3d ed. 1975))); RAN-
DOM HousE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 963 (2d ed. 1987) (defining impute as
"to attribute or ascribe")). See generally Niesig, 76 N.Y.2d at 374, 558 N.E.2d at 1035, 559
N..Y.S.2d at 498. (New York Court of Appeals includes word "impute" in standard restrict-
ing ex parte communications but only applies word "bind" in its interpretation of
standard).
85 See PSE&G, 745 F. Supp. at 1042 ("The change in employment status does not effect
the nature of [a person's] actions vis-a-vis whether they are imputable to the employer.");
Miller & Calfo, supra note 2, at 1072 ("The interest of the corporation in protecting infor-
mation - especially privileged information - acquired by an employee during the course
of employment from disclosure to an opponent in litigation remains after the employee
leaves the corporation."); Stahl, supra note 1, at 1220 ("The comment [to Rule 4.2] does
not distinguish between those whose agency or employment relationship continues at the
time of discovery, but instead focuses on the existence of the relationship at the time of the
events in question") (emphasis added); Reply Affidavit of Geoffrey C.Hazard, Jr., National
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., No. 87C-SE-1 1 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct 23, 1990)
(Westlaw, DE-CS library) ("A former employee may not reveal attorney-client confidences
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the scope of an adversary's discovery rights,3 and is only likely to
be revealed when the enterprise's counsel is not present.3 7
Furthermore, although a decrease in the monetary aspect of
conducting an interview itself seems likely, this is not the case
when viewing at the entire judicial picture. By not using the depo-
sition process, the cost of the required court reporter is saved, and
the attorney may employ a non-attorney investigator to gather the
desired information at a lower cost. 8 The problem, however, is
that the investigators, though not attorneys, are under the same
ethical guidelines as the attorneys who hire them. 9 They must
make certain to introduce themselves properly and that the sub-
ject knows and understands their relationship to the case.40 Any
misrepresentation or misunderstanding caused by the investigator
can lead to pretrial motions for protective orders and suppression,
just as if the employing attorney had made the remark.4" There-
he may have acquired during -employment, or other information the law prohibits him
from divulging . ."). C.f. Mills Land & Water Co. v. Golden West Ref. Co., 186 Cal. App.
3d 116, 128, 230 Cal. Rptr. 461, 468 (1987) (court notes that purpose behind Cal. Rule 7-
103, which is similar to Rule 4.2, includes prevention of information and knowledge ac-
quired by employee during employment from b~ing released to adversary without advice of
counsel after employment).
" See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (party may generally obtain discovery of any relevant matter
which is not privileged);, N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 3101(b) (McKinney 1991) (same).
37 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981). The Court recognized
that an attorney's advice is frequently most significant to individuals who cannot bind the
corporation. Id. Therefore, limiting ex parte communications to a small group of employ-
ees frustrates the purpose of the attorney-client privilege, which is to encourage communi-
cations between the corporate counsel and the employees. Id.
38 See Curley v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 134 F.R.D. 77, 82-83 (D.N.J. 1991) (supporting
claim of lowered cost).
11 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.3(b) (1983). This rule states that
with respect to nonlawyer personnel that are retained by or associated with the lawyer, the
lawyer "must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is compatible
with the professional obligations of the lawyer." Id. It is further provided in rule 5.3(c) that
the lawyer may be responsible for any conduct of the nonlawyer that would be considered
a violation of those obligations. Id at 5.3(c).
40 See id. at 4.3. This rule states as follows:
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a
lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the
lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the
misunderstanding.
Id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4. 1(a) (1983) (attorney's duty not
to misrepresent or mislead others when representing client, includes failures to disclose to
third parties).
41 See supra notes 38-40 and corresponding text (pretrial motions and non-attorney
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fore, it is submitted that the chances of a non-attorney investiga-
tor violating the demanding legal rules governing ethical conduct
for attorneys, are higher than an attorney violating them, which
may ultimately lead to increased costs due to suppression motions.
Finally, if an adverse party gains, or is perceived to have gained
confidential information, the likely outcome will be extended pre-
trial litigation, seeking either a protective order42 or suppression
of all evidence that may have been discovered through the ex
parte contact."' These motions lead to increased expenses for the
client who must pay the costs and expenses of the preclusion mo-
tions, as well as a burdening of the already overloaded courts with
unnecessary litigation." This situation may lead to inevitable de-
lays in bringing the case to trial or settlement, which may call into
question, the attorney's compliance with the ethical rule requiring
attorneys to expedite litigation."
Some judges have recognized these deficiencies, and have at-
tempted to cure them by requiring the issuance of a "miranda let-
ter."4 Such a letter typically explains the positions of the parties,
the issues involved in the lawsuit and the ability of the interviewee
responsibility).
" Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) with N.Y. CIv. PRAc. L. & R. 3103 (McKinney 1991). Both
rules allow a party to seek a protective order from discovery. Id. The court may order,
inter alia, that discovery sought not be allowed at all, only be allowed under specified terms
and conditions, be permitted by an alternative method, or be allowed completely. Id.
4 See id. The moving party may be granted relief in the form of a suspension of the
disclosure which is pending the application for the protective order, or suppression of any
evidence which may have been properly obtained. Id. C.f Cagguila v. Wyeth Laboratories,
Inc., 127 F.R.D. 653, 654-55 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (violation of rule against ex parte contacts
with employee made all such evidence gained inadmissible); Monsanto Co. v. AETNA, Cas-
ualty and Sur. Co., 593 A.2d 1013, 1020 (Del. Super. Ct. 1990) (any evidence obtained as
result of ex parte communications with former employees of adversary not admissible at
trial); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., No. 87C-SE-1 1 (Del. Super. Ct.
Oct. 23, 1990) (Westlaw, DE-CS library) (same).
1 See, e.g., National Union, No. 87C-SE-1 1 (motions seeking protective orders from and
suppression of evidence gained through ex parte interviews, requests for rehearing of mo-
tions, rehearings of the motions and appeals of decisions of judge on motions); supra note
30 (court in PSE&G supports this position).
" See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.2 (1983). This rule states that, "[a]
lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of
the client." Id.
4e See National Union, No. 87C-SE- 11 ("Miranda" type warning letter to former employ-
ees); Monsanto, 593 A.2d at 1021 (ex parte contacts permitted where "miranda letter"
issued).
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to contact the counsel of its former employer, if it so desires.4 7
The problem with miranda letters is that they appear "to induce
the prospective witness to refuse to give information volunta-
rily.'4 8 Such behavior toward a former employee is considered a
violation of Model Rule 3.4(f)(1), which prohibits an attorney
from requesting a person, other than a client, to refrain from vol-
unteering information to another party unless the person is a rela-
tive, employee, or another agent of the client.' 9
B. Allowing Ex Parte Communications with Some Former Employees
This theory attempts to cure the deficiencies of the theory by
not allowing ex parte communications with former employees
who possess confidential information."0 By distinguishing between
different former employees, it is submitted that this theory lacks
the simplicity of implementation possessed by its less restrictive
counterpart. However, this theory shares the benefits and inade-
quacies of the previously discussed theory,51 as well as presenting
additional problems.
While this theory appears to address and resolve the problem
concerning the possession of confidential information by former
employees, in effect, it fails. 2 Since every corporate structure is
different, it is suggested that there is no easy method of discover-
ing who possesses confidential information. Where a lawyer over-
extends discovery to include confidential information, pretrial liti-
"I See, e.g., supra note 46 (discussing letters permitted by court, which include description
of parties and address and phone number of former employer's counsel).
' Defendant's Affidavit of Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Asso-
ciated Elec. & Gas Ins. Serv. Ltd., 745 F. Supp. 1037 (D.N.J. 1990).
" See Reply Affidavit of Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., National Union, No. 87C-SE-1 1 (Del.
Super. Ct. Oct. 23, 1990) (Westlaw, DE-CS library). Professor Hazard, in explaining the
reason that a "miranda letter" should be considered unethical, states that, "a present em-
ployee can be lawfully requested not to talk to opposing counsel. If the same request were
made of a former employee, it would constitute a violation of Rule 3.4, as an interference
with the other side's opportunity to gather evidence." Id.; see also supra note 16 (text of
Rule 3.4(0(1)).
o See supra notes 35-37 and corresponding text (theories and problems dealing with for-
mer employees possessing privileged information).
" See supra notes 30-49 and corresponding text (theory's benefits and deficiencies).
52 See supra note 35 and corresponding text (theory's problems with former employees
possessing privileged information).
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gation once again may become necessary."3 If an attorney
underextends the scope of discovery, the attorney is not acting in
the best interests of the client.54 It is submitted that the only cer-
tain method to determine which former employees possess confi-
dential information is by either mutual consent of the parties to
the litigation or determination by the court. Therefore, it is fur-
ther submitted that this option does not serve as a solution, but
merely shifts the responsibility of determining whether or not the
interviewee possesses confidential information from the corpora-
tion's counsel to the adverse attorney.
C. Not Allowing Ex Parte Communications with Any Former Employee:
The Bright Line Test
This theory is an ethical standard which is simplistic in theory
and practice. It provides a clear standard, in which no guess-work
is required by attorneys in determining with whom they are per-
mitted to speak to informally,5" thus eliminating the result of un-
desirable pretrial litigation. It is submitted that such a bright line
test properly defines the word "impute," as used in the comment
to Model Rule 4.2, to mean to credit or attribute to a person.68
This standard recognizes that both current and former employees
can contribute toward corporate liability, 7 and that "it is impossi-
ble to tell whether an individual's acts or omissions may be im-
puted until that individual has testified to those acts."" It is pro-
posed that this test would also eliminate any coAflict with ethical
rules that would be created by the informal interview process,
61 See supra notes 41-44 and corresponding text (creation of pretrial litigation when for-
,mer employee with privileged information is contacted ex parte).
" See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1983) (lawyer shall provide
competent representation with all skill, thoroughness and preparation which may be rea-
sonably necessary).
'a See Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Serv. Ltd., 745 F. Supp.
1037, 1042 (D.N.J. 1990). The court states that the confusion in this area illustrates the
need for a "bright line test" whereby all ex parte contacts with former employees would be
prohibited. Id.
" See PSE&G, 745 F. Supp. at 1040 ("impute" means "[t]o credit to a person or cause");
supra notes 30-32, 34 and corresponding text (discussing term "impute").
57 See supra note 35 and corresponding text (lack of correlation between employment
status and possession of privileged information).
" PSE&G, 745 F. Supp. at 1042.
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such as misrepresentations and misunderstandings, since the op-
posing attorney would have to clear with the corporate counsel,
any contact intended to be had with the former employee.
Opposition to this theory is based on the premise that such a
broad prohibition on ex parte communications offers the corpo-
rate enterprise too much protection.6" Another concern is the rise
in cost due to the increased use of the formal deposition, although
this cost is partially offset by the reduction in the necessity for
costly pretrial motion practice."1 The perception of increased cost
must also be tempered by the preservation of judicial economy,
which a bright line test promotes.62
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION: ADOPTION OF THE "BRIGHT LINE" TEST
It is submitted that the only theory concerning the permissibil-
ity of ex parte communications with employees of a corporate en-
terprise that meets the standards of ethics and certainty is the
bright line test. The contention that this theory is overly restric-
tive is unfounded, since there is no restriction on the type of in-
formation which may be exchanged, only the manner in which
such an exchange may be accomplished. 3 Also, it should be rec-
ognized that the deposition is a much superior form of evidence as
compared to the ex parte interview.64 It is further suggested that
this theory provides an easily implemented criterion which elimi-
nates the need for pretrial litigation, while complying with all the
relevant ethical rules.
It is troublesome that opponents of this theory base their argu-
ment on a perceived increase in financial costs caused by requiring
depositions, when ethical standards; not financial costs, are what
are truly under consideration. Methods and procedures by which
66 See infra notes 1-54 and accompanying text (difficulties with informal interviews).
00 See, e.g., Curley v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 134 F.R.D. 77, 89 (D.N.J. 1991) (PSE&G
standard too broad).
1 See supra notes 41-44 and corresponding text (costliness of pretrial litigation).
62 See id.
s' See PSE&G, 745 F. Supp. at 1043 (court notes that same information is exchanged in
deposition, except with safety net in place).
" See id. The court states: "[depositions are a] far more reliable and ethically sound
procedure than the informal methods .... It is also true that the deposition process is the
best method of developing clear factual records and protecting the rights of all parties
without unduly favoring or prejudicing either side." Id.
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the law is practiced should evolve from ethical standards; ethical
standards should not be established to accommodate these meth-
ods or procedures. The deposition is a legal procedure; it is sug-
gested that if the costs of using the deposition are too exorbitant,
then methods employed in obtaining depositions should be re-
formed. The ethical rule concerning ex parte contacts, however,
should not suffer.
CONCLUSION
In considering the available options, it has been proposed that
the bright line test is clearly the best standard by which to mea-
sure the permissive extent of ex parte interviews with former em-
ployees. This standard satisfies all ethical precepts, enhances judi-
cial economy and alleviates inconsistencies in application, thereby
making the litigation process much less troublesome for both at-
torney and client.
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